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This paper derives a representation of preferences for a choice theory with vague
environments; vague in the sense that the agent does not know the precise lotteries
over outcomes conditional on states. Instead, he knows only a possible set of these
lotteries for each state. Thus, this paper's main departure from the standard subjective
expected utility model is to relax an assumption about the environment, rather than
weakening the axiomatic structure. My model is consistent with the behavior observed
in the Ellsberg experiment. It can capture the same type of behavior as the multiple
priors models, but can also result in behavior that is dierent from both the behavior
implied by standard subjective expected utility models and the behavior implied by
the multiple priors models.
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11 Introduction
This paper derives a representation of preferences for a choice theory with vague environ-
ments; vague in the sense that the decision maker does not know the precise lotteries over
outcomes conditional on states. Instead, he knows only a possible set of these lotteries for
each state. Taking the standard Anscombe and Aumann (1963) model as a benchmark,
this paper relaxes an assumption about the environment by allowing for acts that are func-
tions from states into sets of lotteries rather than into singleton lotteries. Thus, a vague
environment can be thought of as a hybrid between the Anscombe-Aumann environment
and an environment considered by Ahn (2008) and Olszewski (2007), who both consider
choice between sets of objective lotteries. Anscombe and Aumann's environment is the
special case of this paper's environment where all sets are singleton.1
As an example, consider a situation where the decision maker is a webhost who has to
buy a server for his company. What he cares about is how much he spends on the server
and whether or not it will break down so he loses data. The probability that the server
will break down depends on whether the server has a high load or a low load. The decision
maker can choose between two dierent servers: either a brand-name server or a recently
introduced generic no-brand-name server. For the brand-name server he can go on the web
and look up what the probability of failure is if it has a high load, and what the probability
of failure is if it has a low load. However, for the new no-brand-name product he cannot
nd these probabilities, so his information about that server is much less precise. He does
know the characteristics of the very best servers and the very worst servers in the market,
but he is not sure where the generic server under consideration ts in. This means that
he only knows the possible ranges of the probabilities that the server will fail under a high
respectively low load, rather than the precise probabilities.
In this example, the states of the world are `High load' and `Low load'. The outcomes
the decision maker directly cares about are the possible combinations of money left after
buying the server and having a working versus a broken server. The environment is vague
because the decision maker only knows the possible range of the failure-probability in each
state for the generic server.
It seems intuitive that the decision maker will treat the brand-name server and the
generic server dierently, because he has precise objective information about the proba-
1Anscombe and Aumann's model is often explained as a horse race followed by a spin of a roulette,
where which roulette is spun depends on which horse wins the race. The present paper's title refers to the
fact that it considers decision makers who do not know the exact probabilities on the roulettes.
2bilities in each state for one, but only imprecise objective information about the other.
This suggests that vagueness is an important feature of the environment, which should be
taken into account. As I will demonstrate later, allowing for these vague environments has
important economic implications.
The two main results in the paper (Theorems 2 and 3) provide axioms necessary and
sucient for modeling an agent as if he evaluates an act by computing for each state the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of the best and worst lotteries within the set returned by
the act, then weighs these together, assigns unique subjective probabilities to the states,
and uses these and the weighted utility for each state to compute his overall utility of
the act. The weight on the best lottery has a natural interpretation as a measure of the
agent's optimism, or the weight on the worst as pessimism. In the Optimism-Weighted
Subjective Expected Utility representation (Theorem 2), these weights, i.e. the decision
maker's optimism, are state-independent, while in the Asymmetric Optimism-Weighted
Subjective Expected Utility representation (Theorem 3) they are state-dependent.
My axiomatic structure consists of the standard Anscombe-Aumann axioms, properly
expanded to my more general class of acts, plus two mild additional axioms. The rst of
these roughly says that a decision maker does not mind more vagueness if the additional
vagueness is caused by adding better possibilities, and that he would never like more
vagueness if it is caused by including worse possibilities. The second non-standard axiom
is a dominance axiom, which roughly says that a vague act is strictly worse than a precise
act if the vagueness is caused by adding only strictly worse lotteries to the precise act.
The framework presented in this paper would be a natural model of a world where
there is a continuum of underlying states, which are grouped into coarse discrete states
in the decision maker's perception of the world. Say, for example, that the probability of
an agent being able to do his job eciently depends not only on whether his workplace
is well-functioning or dysfunctional, but varies depending on how dysfunctional it is. The
continuum of states corresponding to dierent degrees of dysfunctionality can be grouped
into the coarse state `dysfunctional workplace' on which the probability of being ecient
ranges from what it is when the workers literally sabotage each other to what it is when
the workers just do not eat lunch together. Such a situation is exactly captured by the
proposed model. I would like to emphasize that this example of decision makers having
a coarse perception of the state space is intended as a motivation. The present paper's
model is one of a xed, known set of states and acts that map these states into sets of
probabilities. For a direct treatment of coarse contingencies, see Epstein, Marinacci, and
3Seo (2007).
The departure from the standard model that I make in this paper is in a dierent dimen-
sion than the departure made in the literature on ambiguity aversion, which includes, for
example, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004),
and Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). That literature does not change the en-
vironment, but instead relaxes the independence axiom. Other examples of papers that
consider non-singleton priors over states are Bewley (1986), Mukerji (1997), Epstein and
Schneider (2003), and Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (forthcoming).
Kreps (1979), Kreps (1992), Nehring (1999), Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001), and
Ozdenoren (2002) derive the decision maker's subjective state space from his preferences.
Although they involve sets, the objects of choice are fundamentally dierent from those in
the present paper. In the subjective state space literature the decision maker has a future
choice among the alternatives in the set, while in the present paper it is nature that makes
the future choice.
Other related papers where the objects of choice involve sets are Ghirardato (2001),
Olszewski (2007), and Ahn (2008). Ghirardato (2001) generalizes the Savage framework
by allowing the acts to be mappings from states into sets of consequences rather than
into unique consequences, while I generalize the Anscombe and Aumann framework and
have acts map into sets of lotteries. In addition to the dierence in domains, there are
also important dierences in the representations obtained in Ghirardato (2001) and here,
which I will discuss after the main representation theorems in section 3.
Olszewski (2007) and Ahn (2008) provide axioms and representation theorems for a
decision maker who chooses between sets of lotteries. Their environments can, adjusting
for technical dierences, be viewed as one-state versions of the environment I consider, and
hence they do not consider the problem of assigning subjective probabilities to states. Con-
ceptually, if we interpret Olszewski's model as a model of `objective ambiguity', the model
in the present paper allows for asymmetric objective ambiguity, where the asymmetry can
be both across states and across acts. The representations in my Theorems 1 and 3 then
allow for the decision maker's attitude towards objective ambiguity, i.e. his optimism, to
be asymmetric across states as well, while Theorem 2 gives axioms necessary and sucient
for his optimism to be state-independent. The relationship to Olszewski will be discussed
in detail after Theorem 1.
Finally, a number of recent papers in econometrics have been concerned with set valued
random variables, see for example Manski and Tamer (2002). A vague act is exactly a set-
4valued random variable, thus the present paper provides a choice theory associated with
these.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 the axioms
on preferences are introduced and the representation theorems are derived. In section 4
the model is applied to a simple contracting problem, and it is shown how the introduction
of vagueness changes the optimal contract. Section 5 concludes and discusses directions
for further research.
2 A Model of Vague Environments
Let S = f1;:::;ng be a nite set of states and let X = fx1;:::;xmg be a nite set
of consequences, i.e., the outcomes the decision maker directly cares about. Let  be
the set of all probability distributions, or lotteries, over X. Compound lotteries from 
are identied by their reduced form lotteries. Finally, let P be the space of non-empty,
compact, and convex polyhedral2 subsets of . Note that this space includes all singletons
from . Dene an act h by:
h : S ! P
h(s) = Ps
h 2 P for all s = 1;:::;n:
Hence, the acts are functions mapping states into P (or correspondences mapping states
into sets of lotteries with the properties described above). Let H denote the set of all such
acts. The decision maker has preferences over H , represented by the binary relation .
Figure 1 illustrates an act h in the case of 2 states and 3 outcomes. Each triangle
x1x2x3 is a probability simplex . Here, xi is the lottery in the simplex that yields
outcome xi with probability 1. The sets of lotteries h(s1) and h(s2) are presented as
hatched areas. Thus, all the decision maker knows is that if he chooses the act h the
probability of getting x2 is greater than 1
2 if state 1 occurs and smaller than 1
4 if state 2
occurs.
It is important to notice that the decision maker has to choose his action without
knowing which state will occur. Each of the acts induces a set of conditional probabilities
over the outcomes for each of the states. For some states and acts this set can be a singleton,
but generally it is not, as was the case for the generic server in the introductory example.
Allowing for the acts to return sets of lotteries in some states permits the decision maker
2I.e. with a nite number of vertices.




































h(s1) = fp 2  : p2  1
2g
h(s2) = fp 2  : p2  1
4g
to have a vague idea about the likelihood of dierent outcomes. However, since the sets
typically dier from act to act there is still a dierence between acts in the vague states.
Two special cases are worth mentioning. First, if anything is possible in some state we
have h(s) =  for that state, i.e. conditional on that state the set an act returns is equal
to the entire probability simplex. Second, Anscombe and Aumann's model corresponds to
for all acts having h(s) 2  for all states, i.e to having the set be a singleton for all states.
Hence their environment is nested within the present environment.
Assuming that the sets are compact and convex with a nite number of vertices is the
same as assuming that the decision maker knows the extreme points of the set and that
everything in between is possible. It implies that the decision maker has an idea about the
best and worst probability that could occur. It also implies that if vagueness of a state
results in the agent not knowing the precise probability distribution implied by an act,
then his knowledge is only precise enough to give a range of possible probabilities. We
will not have a situation where, for example, the agent knows that he will face one of two
known probability distributions in a state, or where, as another example, the probability
of a particular outcome conditional on some state is either very high or very low, but not
around 1
2.

































3 Optimism-Weighted Subjective Expected Utility
For P;Q 2 P dene the convex combination P+(1 )Q = fp+(1 )q jp 2 P; q 2 Qg.
Note that the parameter  is xed, while we run over all the elements of the sets P and
Q. For h;g 2 H the convex combination h + (1   )g is taken this way pointwise, i.e.
state by state. A convex combination of a triangular set P and a line segment Q in a state
s is illustrated in Figure 2, where the triangle x1x2x3 is a probability simplex.
I now turn to the axioms. The rst three are standard Anscombe and Aumann axioms
extended to the more general class of acts considered in the present paper.
Axiom 1 (Preference Relation)  on H is a preference relation, that is, it is asym-
metric (if h  g then g  h) and negatively transitive (if h  g and g  f then h  f).
Axiom 2 (Set Independence) For all acts h;h0;g 2 H , and for all scalars  2 (0;1]; h 
h0 ) h + (1   )g  h0 + (1   )g.
Axiom 3 (Continuity) For all acts h;h0;h00 2 H ; if h  h0  h00 then there exist scalars
; 2 (0;1) such that h + (1   )h00  h0  h + (1   )h00.
Axiom 1 is subject to the standard critique, but the critique is no more severe for this
type of acts than for standard acts. Axiom 3 is a standard Archimedian axiom. To see
7why the independence axiom reasonably extends to sets, note that the axiom implies that
indierence curves between singleton lotteries are linear and that the convex combination
of two singleton lotteries is worse than the better lottery and better than the worse lottery.
The convex combination of two sets consists of lotteries that are all convex combinations of
individual lotteries in the two sets. The set independence axiom implies that this convex
combination set of lotteries that lie in between lotteries from the two sets in terms of
preference will lie between the other two sets in terms of preference as well. Generally, we
can think of independence in the present context the usual way, that a decision maker will
focus his attention on the dierences between acts, and hence making the same substitution
for two acts will not alter the preference between them.
The set independence axiom is not rejected by the usual Ellsberg argument. To see
this, note that the 2-urn Ellsberg experiment can be reinterpreted as a one-state version of
my environment. Here we interpret the information Ellsberg gives about the urns as the
decision maker's objective information. We have 1 state, 2 outcomes, and 4 acts, which
in the one-state version of the environment are sets of lotteries. Then bets on the urn
with unknown proportions of the balls are vague acts, while bets on the urn with known
proportions are precise acts. Hence, the Ellsberg experiment ts naturally in the vague
framework, and the axioms presented in this paper can generate behavior consistent with
that observed in the Ellsberg experiment: for an optimism parameter less than 1
2, the
representation below is consistent with the majority of subjects' behavior of preferring
bets on the urn with known proportions. Also, the representation is consistent with the
behavior reported by Ellsberg of the two minority groups, who either prefer bets on the
urn with unknown proportions or are indierent between betting on either urn. In my
representation these decision makers' optimism parameters are greater than 1
2 or equal to
1
2, respectively.
A few denitions are needed before I can present the next two axioms, which are non-
standard. Dene weak preference % by h % g if g  h, and indierence by h  g if h  g
and g  h. Let Psh denote the act that returns the set P 2 P in state s and agrees with
act h in all other states s0 6= s:
Psh(s) = P
Psh(s0) = h(s0) for all s0 6= s:
As a special case psh denotes the act that returns the singleton lottery p 2  in state s
and agrees with act h in all other states. I.e. a lower case letter means that state s returns
a singleton lottery.
8For sets P1;:::;Pk 2 P let Co(P1;:::;Pk) denote the convex hull of the sets. For
acts h1;:::;hk the convex hull Co(h1;:::;hk) is taken pointwise, i.e. state by state.
Axiom 4 (Set Convexity) For all acts h 2 H ; and for all sets of lotteries P;Q 2 P,
if Psh % Qsh then Psh % Co(Psh;Qsh) % Qsh.
Set convexity says that if two acts return the same sets in all other states, and if having
the set P in state s is at least as good as having the set Q in state s, then having all mixes
between P and Q as possibilities in state s is no better than having only the possibilities
in P and no worse than having only the possibilities in Q in state s. Hence, the decision
maker will not be made worse o by including weakly better possibilities, and will not
be made better o by including weakly worse possibilities. Note that the axiom merely
requires the decision maker to feel this way about acts that agree in all but a single state s.
He is allowed to feel dierently when making more complex comparisons of acts that dier
in multiple states. As such the axiom is not very restrictive, and it is very natural in the
presence of Axiom 2. The set independence axiom implies that any convex combination
of two sets is no better than the best set and no worse than the worst set. When we take
the convex hull we include all such convex combinations. Since we are only including sets
that lie in between the original sets in terms of preference, it is reasonable that doing so
will not make the decision maker better o than he is with only the best set and not worse
o than he is with only the worst set. Intuitively, Axiom 4 says that the decision maker
does not mind more vague acts if the additional vagueness is caused by including (weakly)
better lotteries in the possible set. On the other hand, he would never like more vagueness
if it is caused by including (weakly) worse lotteries.
Axiom 5 (Dominance) For all acts h 2 H ; for all lotteries p 2 ; and for all sets of
lotteries Q 2 P, if psh  qsh for all q 2 Q then psh  Co(psh;Qsh)  Qsh.
Dominance says that if two acts return the same set in all other states, and if having
the lottery p in state s is preferred to having any of the lotteries in the set Q in state s then
having all mixes of p and Q as possibilities in state s is worse than having the lottery p for
sure, but better than having only the lotteries in Q. Thus, adding strictly better lotteries
to a set makes the decision maker better o, while adding only worse possibilities makes
him worse o. Intuitively, a vague act is strictly worse than a precise act if the vagueness
is caused by including only strictly worse lotteries. On the other hand, the decision maker
9likes more vagueness if it results from including strictly better lotteries. Note that this
axiom also only concerns acts that dier in just a single state.
Axioms 4 and 5 may at rst glance seem quite similar, but the important dierences
are that Axiom 5 applies to strict preference and only concerns disjoint sets, while Axiom
4 applies to weak preference and also concerns how the decision maker feels about sets that
might intersect. Axiom 4 implies that no set is better than its best element or worse than
its worst element. Therefore the utility of the set can be expressed in terms of the utilities
of its best and worst lotteries. Axiom 5 then ensures that the decision maker's weighting
of the best and worst lotteries is the same for all sets.
Theorem 1 Axioms 1 through 5 are necessary and sucient for the existence of state-
dependent Bernoulli utility functions us() over the outcomes3 and unique state-dependent
parameters s 2 (0;1) that capture the decision maker's level of optimism in state s, such
that
for all h;g 2 H ; h % g



























where hs and h
s
are, respectively, the worst and best lotteries in Ps
h, while gs and gs are,
respectively, the worst and best lotteries in Ps
g.
Outline of proof: I use a sequence of lemmas to prove that the axioms are sucient for
the representation. In Lemma 2 the mixture space theorem is used to show that Axioms
1 through 3 are equivalent to existence and linearity of the representation. Lemma 3 then
shows that the representation is separable over states. Lemma 4 shows that for mixtures
between two acts, mixtures with a higher weight on the better act are preferred to mixtures
with a lower weight on the better act, while Lemma 5 shows that an act will be indierent
to a convex combination of a weakly better and a weakly worse act, and, as long as these
two acts are not indierent to each other, this convex combination is unique.
3us() is non-constant and unique up to a positive ane transformation if state s is non-null (dened
below).
10So far everything has followed from only Axioms 1, 2, and 3. Lemma 6 is the rst of
the lemmas that invokes Axiom 4. Lemmas 6 through 10 consider acts that dier in only a
single state s. Lemma 6 shows that if h(s) is a line, and if the acts that give the endpoints
of this line in state s are not indierent to each other, then there exists a unique convex
combination of the latter two acts to which h(s) is indierent. Lemma 7 shows that if
we consider an act h, where h(s) is a subset of a line, then the weighting of the better
and worse endpoints of this subset is the same as the weighting of the better and worse
endpoints for the larger set, while Lemma 8 shows that this weighting has to be the same
for two acts where the sets in state s are both lines and these lines are parallel. Lemmas 7
and 8 build on Lemma 6 but do not further invoke Axiom 4. Lemma 9 extends the result
in Lemma 8 to acts where the lines are not parallel. Lemma 9 uses Axiom 4 and it is the
only part of the proof of Theorem 1 that invokes Axiom 5. Lemma 10 then shows that if
h(s) is any set P 2 P then the act h will be indierent to an act which in state s returns
a line between the best and worst lotteries in P. Lemma 10 directly invokes Axiom 4.
It is now straightforward to show that the weight s is the same for all sets in state s.
I then show that the representation holds for singleton sets by induction on the size of the
support of the lotteries and Lemma 3. Finally, Lemmas 3, 6, and 10 are used to show that
the representation holds for general P 2 P.
It is fairly easy to show necessity of the axioms. The detailed proof of Theorem 1 is in
the appendix. 
If we were to only accept Axioms 1 through 3, we would get existence and linearity of
the representation, and that it is additively separable over states. If we furthermore accept
Axiom 4, we get that each set will be evaluated in terms of its best and worst lotteries.
However, the weight on the best and worst could depend on the set. By also accepting
Axiom 5 we get that the weighting is the same for all sets.
The interpretation of s as capturing the decision maker's optimism in state s can be
given the following behavioral justication: Suppose two decision makers with preferences
%1 and %2 have the same ranking of singleton sets in state s, i.e. psh %1 rsh , psh %2
rsh 8p;r 2 ; h 2 H . Then we can think of %2 as more optimistic than than %1 if
Psh %1 qsh ) Psh %2 qsh and Psh 1 qsh ) Psh 2 qsh 8P 2 P; q 2 ; h 2 H .
That is, if %1 prefers a vague act over a precise act in state s, then %2 always prefers the
vague act as well. Therefore, %2 can be viewed as having a more optimistic view of what
the outcome of the vagueness will be. A more optimistic decision maker will have a higher
11s. If s approaches zero, we approach the case where the decision maker is extremely
pessimistic and takes only the worst possibility into account. If, on the other hand, s
approaches one, we approach the case where the decision maker is extremely optimistic
and takes only the best possibility into account. The limits  = 0 and  = 1 require that
we relax dominance. We get a representation with  = 0 if we do not impose Axiom 5 and
use the special instance of Axiom 4 where if Psh % Qsh then Co(Psh;Qsh)  Qsh. We get
a representation with  = 1 if we do not impose Axiom 5 and use the special instance of
Axiom 4 where if Psh % Qsh then Co(Psh;Qsh)  Psh.
In each state, indierence curves between singleton lotteries are linear. For general sets
there is either a unique best lottery or, if the highest von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is
achieved along one of the edges of the set, a continuum thereof. The same applies for the
worst lottery or lotteries. For each state, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of the best
lottery is unique given the representation, as is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of
the worst lottery.
If we restrict the model to a single state, the representation in Theorem 1 above is the
same as that obtained in Olszewski (2007). Olszewski's Theorem 3 applies to a domain
which is a one-state version of a vague environment. For this domain he provides axioms
that are sucient for the representation in Theorem 1 when we restrict it to a single state.
In essence, by establishing that my axioms are necessary and sucient for the representa-
tion, I show that by strengthening Olszewski's Set S-Independence and Set S-Solvability
axioms to my Axioms 2 and 3, his Axiom 6 (Two-Set Union) becomes redundant.4
The representation in Theorem 1 has a lot of structure, but for applications even more
structure, namely state-independent Bernoulli utility and uniquely determined subjective
probabilities over states, is often desirable. The extra structure can be obtained by adding
another two standard axioms: a non-triviality axiom and a state independence axiom,
also extended to my more general class of acts. Whether the optimism-parameter is state-
independent as well, depends on which set of acts the state-independence axiom is imposed
4Olszewski's Set S-Solvability follows from my Lemma 5, hence it is implied by my Axioms 1 through
3, and my Axiom 2 is stronger than, and implies, his Set S-Independence. My Axiom 4 and Olszewski's
weak GDSB are quite similar, he imposes A1 - A2 ) A1 - PA1 + (1   P)A2 - A2 for all P  [0;1] with
the uniqueness property, while I just impose it for P = [0;1] (the convex hull). Weak GDSB with P = p (a
singleton) is implied by my Axiom 2. My Axiom 5 is weaker than Olszewski's strict GDSB, since it allows
one set to be singleton, and I only impose the axiom for P=[0,1], while he imposes it for all P dierent
from f0g and f1g. Strong GDSB with P = p is implied by my Axioms 2 and 4.
12on.
Axiom 6 (Non-triviality) There exist acts h;g 2 H such that h  g.
Dene a state s0 to be null if for all acts h;g 2 H for which h(s) = g(s) in every s 6= s0
we have that h  g.
Axiom 7 (Set State Independence) For all acts h 2 H ; and for all sets of lotteries
P;Q 2 P, if there exists some state s such that Psh  Qsh, then Ps0h  Qs0h for all
non-null s0.
Axiom 7' (State Independence) For all acts h 2 H ; and for all singleton lotteries
p;q 2 , if there exists some state s such that psh  qsh, then ps0h  qs0h for all non-null
s0.
Axiom 7 says that the decision maker's preference over sets of lotteries is state-independent,
which implies that both the decision maker's preference over singleton lotteries and how he
averages lotteries are state-independent. Axiom 7' only requires that the decision maker's
preference over singleton lotteries is state-independent. Hence, Axiom 7' is weaker than
Axiom 7.
Adding Axioms 6 and 7 to the rst ve axioms results in Theorem 2, which is the
Optimism-Weighted Subjective Expected Utility (OWSEU) representation and the main
result in this paper. If we instead impose Axioms 1 through 6 and 7', i.e. relax Set
State Independence to State Independence, we get the Asymmetric Optimism-Weighted
Subjective Expected Utility (AOWSEU) representation in Theorem 3.5 Discussion of both
these results follows after Theorem 3.
Theorem 2 (Optimism-Weighted Subjective Expected Utility) Axioms 1 through
7 are necessary and sucient for the existence of a non-constant, state-independent Bernoulli
utility function u() over outcomes, a unique probability measure  over states, and a unique
state-independent parameter  2 (0;1) that captures the decision maker's level of optimism,
such that
for all h;g 2 H ; h % g
if and only if





























where hs and h
s
are, respectively, the worst and best lotteries in Ps
h, while gs and gs are,
respectively, the worst and best lotteries in Ps
g. The Bernoulli utility function u() is unique
up to a positive ane transformation.
Outline of proof: Axiom 6 guarantees that there exists at least one non-null state. That
Axiom 7 has to hold for acts where the sets in state s are singletons is used to show that
there exists a state-independent Bernoulli utility function. That Axiom 7 has to hold for
any sets P and Q is used to show that the optimism-parameter must be the same for all
states. Finally I get the subjective probabilities from the scaling of the Bernoulli utility
function in the dierent states (remember that Bernoulli utility functions are unique up to
a positive ane transformation). Necessity of the axioms is again fairly easy to show. The
detailed proof of Theorem 2 is in the appendix.6 
Theorem 3 (Asymmetric Optimism-Weighted Subjective Expected Utility)
Axioms 1 through 6 and 7' are necessary and sucient for the existence of a non-constant,
state-independent Bernoulli utility function u() over outcomes, a unique probability mea-
sure  over states, and unique state-dependent parameters s 2 (0;1) that capture the
decision maker's level of optimism in state s, such that
for all h;g 2 H ; h % g





























6There also exists a representation with state-dependent Bernoulli-utility where subjective probabili-
ties over states are not identied. Since I am interested in the the representation most operational for
applications, the focus here is on the state-independent representation.
14where hs and h
s
are, respectively, the worst and best lotteries in Ps
h, while gs and gs are,
respectively, the worst and best lotteries in Ps
g. The Bernoulli utility function u() is unique
up to a positive ane transformation.
Proof: Please see the appendix. 
The OWSEU representation in Theorem 2 shows that we can model the decision maker
as if he evaluates an act by computing for each state the usual von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility of the best lottery and of the worst lottery in that state's set and weighting them
together, where the weight on the best lottery can be interpreted as the decision maker's
level of optimism. The decision maker assigns unique subjective probabilities to the states
and computes his overall utility using these and the weighted utility for each state.
Decision-making in vague environments where acts map states into sets of lotteries is
potentially a very complex aair. Pushing the interpretation of the OWSEU representation
a bit, we could view the decision maker as if he simplies his decision making process by
taking into consideration only the very best and the very worst among all the lotteries he
could possibly come across in each state. Under this interpretation, his simplication of the
problem even goes beyond this, since how much emphasis he puts on the best respectively
worst lottery is independent of exactly how the possible set of lotteries looks. Furthermore,
in Theorem 2 the emphasis on the best and worst is independent of which state will be
realized, which is reected by the state-independence of the optimism-parameter : the
decision maker puts weight  on the best possibility and weight (1   ) on the worst
possibility in the set, regardless of the state. Dierent acts are then compared using
this weighting between the best and worst in constructing a subjective expected utility,
assigning unique subjective probabilities to the states.
From the above, the appeal of Theorem 2 for applications is clear. All we need to
characterize a decision maker is a Bernoulli utility function, an optimism-parameter, and
a unique probability distribution over states characterizing his beliefs. Once we know the
Bernoulli utility function, we get the best and worst lotteries in each set for free.
Theorem 3 lies between Theorems 1 and 2. The AOWSEU representation in Theorem
3 allows for asymmetric optimism across states, while at the same time the subjective
probability measure is uniquely determined, as is the Bernoulli-utility function (up to a
positive ane transformation). In any given state the decision maker's weighting of the
best and worst lotteries is independent of the set of lotteries under evaluation, just as in
15Theorem 2. However, with asymmetric optimism the weighting of the best and worst will
generally dier between states.
Axioms 4, 5, and either Axiom 7 or 7', all play important parts in achieving the sim-
plifying structure. Without the strong form of state independence, the decision maker's
optimism will in general depend on the state. Without the weak version of state indepen-
dence we cannot disentangle the Bernoulli utility functions from the subjective probabili-
ties, and a representation with state-independent utilities will generally not exist. Without
the dominance axiom the weighting between the best and the worst lotteries in each state
could depend on the shape of the particular set the act returns in that state. If we were to
further drop the set convexity axiom, the decision maker could potentially take all lotteries
in the possible set into account, and modeling his decision-making process would be highly
complex.
If the decision maker were boundedly rational it is very unlikely that he would be
able to undertake such highly complex comparisons of acts. It is much more reasonable
to expect that he simplies the problem. Thus, Theorems 2 and 3 could be interpreted
as an axiomatization and representation of decision making under some form of bounded
rationality.
Returning to the server example from the introduction, we see that which server the
decision maker will choose depends on his level of optimism. The more optimistic he is,
the more inclined he will be to buy the no-brand-name server. This is the case because,
for the brand-name server, the over-all emphasis the decision maker puts on server-failure
is independent of his level of optimism since his information about this server is precise.
For the generic server, on the other hand, the vagueness results in his over-all emphasis on
server-failure being lower the more optimistic he is.
When  diers across states, my model captures behavior that is clearly dierent
from behavior under the multiple priors approach. Again, I use the server example as an
illustration. In my environment we have the two states fHigh load, Low loadg  fH;Lg,
the relevant outcomes are fFailure, No failureg  fF;Ng, and buying the generic server is a
vague act g with g(H) = [a;b] and g(L) = [c;d], where the intervals are for the probability
of No failure. Assume that u(N) > u(F), that the states H and L reect, respectively,
a boom and a recession, and that buyers of the server become extremely pessimistic in a
recession so that L = 0, while H > 0. Then
AOWSEU(g) = (H)[Hb + (1   H)a]u(N) + (H)[H(1   b) + (1   H)(1   a)]u(F)
+(1   (H))cu(N) + (1   (H))(1   c)u(F):
16Suppose the producer of the generic server can invest in the following 4 projects:
1) research or advertising raising a,
2) research or advertising raising b,
3) research or advertising raising c, and
4) research or advertising raising d.
Assume also, for simplicity, that he can perfectly price discriminate. When faced with
consumers with the asymmetric optimism just described, the producer would pay positive
amounts for projects 1), 2), and 3), but nothing for 4). If we were to redene the problem
to take the multiple priors approach, with S = fHN;HF;LN;LFg and a set of priors
A = f = (HpH;H(1   pH);(1   H)pL;(1   H)(1   pL) j pH 2 [a;b];pL 2 [c;d]g,
we would get that the producer of the generic server would pay for 1) if and only if he
would pay for 3), and that he would pay for 2) if and only if he would pay for 4), since the
multiple priors approach does not allow for asymmetric ambiguity attitude. The example
is simple, but the described behavior seems reasonable, and the example illustrates that my
model captures more types of behavior than the multiple priors models do. Importantly,
my model accomplishes this while maintaining a structure with Bernoulli utility functions,
beliefs, and optimism parameters.
Comparison of Theorem 2 with the main representation result in Ghirardato (2001)
shows important dierences in the representations obtained in the two papers. In Ghi-
rardato's main representation result (see his Theorem 2 and Corollary 1), an act is eval-
uated by weighting an optimistic and a pessimistic component, but his weights depend
on the act under evaluation, his beliefs are non-additive and depend on the weight used
in the representation, and the belief function for the pessimistic component is generally
dierent from the belief function for the optimistic component. On the contrary, in my
OWSEU-representation in Theorem 2, the weight  on the best lottery is the same across
all sets, states, and acts, and beliefs are additive and independent of the act. Ghirardato
also considers a representation in which the weight does not depend on the act (see his
Corollary 2 and Theorem 3), but beliefs are still non-additive and indexed by the act under
evaluation.
Finally, there are many applied problems that make use of probabilities being objective,
and where my model is therefore much more appealing than a model with subjective
multiple priors. This is, for example, the case in Vier (2007) where I, among other things,
revisit a problem considered in Holmstr om (1979) of when it will be valuable for a principal
to condition a contract on an outside signal. I show that it can be optimal for the principal
17to condition the contract on an outside vague signal, even if this signal is orthogonal to
the directly payo relevant variables of interest, which provides a nice explanation for
the granting of stock options to rank-and-le employees who individually have negligible
inuence on company performance. This problem is meaningful when probabilities are
objective, since it will then be clear whether or not the signal is orthogonal. With subjective
beliefs, the problem does not make as much sense.
4 How Vagueness Matters: A Contracting Problem
To illustrate the economic implications of the more general decision-making environments
introduced above, this section considers the consequences of vagueness for a simple con-
tracting problem. The introduction of vagueness substantially changes the problem and
thus yields dierent predictions than the standard approach. Even more interesting is the
resulting fundamental change in the mechanism behind the optimal contract. Vagueness
gives room for the principal to aect which nal scenario the agent puts most emphasis on
through the design of the contract.
The canonical textbook principal-agent problem with hidden information (see e.g. Mas-
Colell et al. (1995)) considers a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent. The principal
wants to hire the agent to complete a task. It is assumed that the agent's utility depends
on a variable, here interpreted as his eciency level, the value of which is realized after the
contract is signed. Suppose that the agent's eort can be measured by a one-dimensional
variable e 2 [0;1). The principal's gross prot is a function of eort, (e), with (0) = 0,
0(e) > 0, and 00(e) < 0 8e.
The agent's Bernoulli utility function depends on his wage w, how much eort he
chooses to exert, and his eciency x, which aects how much disutility he experiences
from eort. Assume for simplicity that there are only two possible values of x: the agent
is either of high-eciency type xH or of low-eciency type xL. Assume that his Bernoulli
utility function is of the form
u(w;e;x) = v(w   g(e;x)); v0() > 0; v00() < 0:
Assume also that g(0;xH) = g(0;xL) = ge(0;xH) = ge(0;xL) = 0, such that he suers no
disutility if he does not exert any eort, that ge(e;x) > 0 8e > 0 and gee(e;x) > 0 8e, such
that his disutility from eort is increasing at an increasing rate, and that g(e;xL) > g(e;xH)
and ge(e;xL) > ge(e;xH), such that his disutility and marginal disutility from eort are
higher if he is of low-eciency type. Finally, let u denote the agent's reservation utility.
18One could, for example, think of the principal as a large food processing company
and the agent as a potato farmer entering an arrangement where the processing company
provides the potato seed and nancing for the crop and the farmer puts in his land and
labor. The company has a standardized process all of its farmers must follow, a process
which is new to the farmer. Therefore, he is not sure how much disutility he will suer.
The contracting environment is as follows: The senate is currently debating whether to
change environmental policies, which would aect farming. There are two possible states of
the world. In state 1 the legislation remains unchanged, while in state 2 it is changed. With
the current legislation, both parties know that the probability of a farmer being ecient
with the production process is p1. If, however, legislation is changed, both parties are less
sure about the probability of the agent being ecient, since the two sides of the senate
strongly disagree and the new legislation would likely be some compromise. Therefore, in
state 2 the parties only know that the probability of the agent being of high-eciency type
is p2 2 Q  [0;1].
Assume that the principal and the agent both maximize Optimism-Weighted Subjective
Expected Utility (OWSEU), that their subjective probabilities of state 1 are P
1 and A
1
respectively, and that their optimism-parameters are P and A respectively.
Consider the rst-best situation where the value of the parameter x is observable by
both contracting parties and would also be veriable by a court. In this situation the
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2 are the lotteries in Q that are best and worst, respectively, from the
principal's point of view, and pA
2 and pA
2 are the lotteries in Q that are best and worst,
respectively, from the agent's point of view. In the terminology of sections 2 and 3, the
19acts the principal chooses between are all the feasible contracts he could oer, while the
acts the agent chooses between are accepting the oered contract or taking the outside
option.
Using the rst-order conditions of the problem, it is easy to show that, as in the
standard model with no vagueness, the participation constraint binds such that the agent
gets exactly his reservation utility, and the optimal contract will specify eort levels e
H
and e










L) will fully insure the agent against all risk and exactly give him










If any of the contracting parties assigns positive probability to the vague state, the
result changes substantially. The reason is a fundamental change in the mechanism behind
the contracts. Suppose the principal thinks the legislation will remain unchanged and
hence has beliefs P = 1 that the precise state will occur, while the agent assigns positive
probability to the vague state and hence has beliefs A < 1. Thus, there is vagueness for
the agent, but no vagueness for the principal.7
To illustrate the intuition and the mechanism that arises from vagueness in an easy
and tractable way, consider the following example:
(e) = e1=2; v() = log(); g(e;x) =
e2
x
; xL = 1; xH = 8; and u = 0:
Let A = p1 = 1=2 and p2 2 [0;b] with b > 1
2.
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal contract as a function of the agent's optimism. If he
is suciently optimistic, that is, if A >
b p1
b , the optimal contract does not fully insure
the agent. Instead, the principal will oer a contract where the parties disagree on which
nal scenario is the best. The contract makes the agent better o if he turns out to be of
type xL than if he turns out to be of type xH, but makes the principal better o if the
agent turns out to be of type xH. The agent gets a relatively low compensation if he turns
out to be of type xH, but a relatively high compensation if he turns out to be of type xL.
Since the optimistic agent puts most emphasis on the best scenario for him, in which he is
of type xL, he does not mind the relatively low compensation if he is of type xH.
7The mechanism is even stronger when both parties face vagueness. The assumption that only the
agent faces vagueness is made for simplicity. The consequences of vagueness for contracting problems are
investigated more comprehensively in Vier (2007).
20Figure 3: Optimal contracts when only the agent faces vagueness
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What drives this result is that which lotteries are best and worst for the agent depends
on the contract oered. Hence, the presence of vagueness gives room for the principal
to aect which nal scenario the agent puts most emphasis on through the design of the
contract. The principal can exploit the presence of optimism to oer contracts that are
better from his point of view. This is a crucial dierence from the standard model with
no vagueness where, even if the parties have heterogeneous beliefs, the beliefs do not
depend on the contract and thus the over-all weights on the dierent nal scenarios are
also independent of the contract.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have derived a representation of preferences for a choice theory with vague
environments; vague in the sense that the agent does not know the precise lotteries over
outcomes conditional on states. Instead, he knows only a possible set of these lotteries. The
result is the Optimism-Weighted Subjective Expected Utility (OWSEU) and Asymmetric
Optimism-Weighted Subjective Expected Utility (AOWSEU) representations, where the
decision maker evaluates acts by computing for each state the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility of the best and worst lotteries within the set and weighting them together according
to his optimism, and then computes his overall utility using these weighted utilities and
unique subjective probabilities over the states. The model is consistent with the behavior
observed in the Ellsberg experiment. It can capture the same type of behavior as the
multiple priors models, but can also result in behavior that is dierent from both the
behavior implied by standard subjective expected utility models and the behavior implied
21by the multiple priors models.
Given the important implications for contracting problems8 we can expect vagueness to
generate very interesting predictions in other economic applications. For example, vague-
ness could have interesting eects for no trade results and lemons problems. We can expect
trade to occur more often in a vague world than in a world with precise information. With
vagueness, willingness to sell an item does not mean that the seller necessarily has infor-
mation that the item is not worth much, such willingness can now arise as a result of the
seller being pessimistic. Consequently, prices will not reveal as much information about
asset values in a vague world as they do when there is no vagueness.
Vagueness could also have eects on asset pricing in the following way: the presence of
vagueness changes individuals' investment problems and hence their demand for dierent
assets. Specically, some agents, depending on their level of optimism/pessimism, could
want to not participate in the markets for risky assets. The existence of such agents will
aect prices in general equilibrium.
These further investigations of the implications of vagueness for economic problems are
left for future research.
Appendix
Lemma 1 shows that the set of acts H is a mixture space.
Lemma 1 The set of acts H with the family of functions  : H H ! H for  2 [0;1]
dened by (h;g) = h + (1   )g is a mixture space.
Proof: I have to show that the three dening properties of a mixture space are satised:
(i) 1(h;g) = 1  h + 0  g = h.
(ii) (h;g) = h + (1   )g = 1 (g;h).
(iii) I have to show that ((h;g);g) = (h;g). In order to see this, note that
((h;g);g) = fx + (1   )y + (1   )y0 jx 2 h;y 2 g;y0 2 gg. To see that
(h;g)  ((h;g);g) note that y = y0 ) (1   )y + (1   )y0 = (1   )y. To see
that ((h;g);g)  (h;g) we will show that f(1   )y + (1   )y0 jy 2 g;y0 2 gg 
f(1   )y jy 2 gg. Suppose t 2 f(1   )y + (1   )y0 jy 2 g;y0 2 gg. Then there exists







8These are investigated further in Vier (2007).
22where the expression in square brackets is an element of g, since g is convex. Thus there
exists y00 2 g such that t = ((1 )+1 )y00 = (1 )y00 ) t 2 f(1 )y jy 2 gg. 
Theorem 1 is proved in a sequence of lemmas. Lemma 2 shows existence and linearity
of the representation.
Lemma 2  on H satises Axioms 1-3 if and only if there exists F : H ! < such that
(i) h  g , F(h) > F(g),
(ii) F(h + (1   )g) = F(h) + (1   )F(g).
Proof: This follows directly from the mixture space theorem, see Kreps (1988). 
Lemmas 3, 4, and 5 are pretty standard (see for example Kreps (1988)) as are their
proofs. Lemma 3 shows that the representation is separable over states.
Lemma 3 The function F, dened in Lemma 2, satises F(h) =
Pn
s=1 Fs(hs).
Proof: Fix some h = (h1;:::;hn) 2 H . For any h 2 H , let h1 = (h1;h2;:::;hn),












To see this recall that convex combinations are done pointwise. Consider state 1 (the proof










































For s = 1;:::;n, dene Fs : P ! < by Fs(P) = F(h1;:::;hs 1;P;hs+1;:::;hn)  
n 1
n F(h). For h 2 H , this denition gives Fs(hs) = F(hs)   n 1




s=1 Fs(hs) = 1
n
Pn
s=1 F(hs)   n 1




s=1 Fs(hs) = 1
nF(h) + n 1
n F(h)   n 1
n F(h) ) F(h) =
Pn
s=1 Fs(hs). 
23Lemma 4 shows that for mixtures between two acts, mixtures with a higher weight on
the better act are preferred to mixtures with a lower weight on the better act.
Lemma 4 For all h;g 2 H , if h  g and 0   <   1 then h+(1 )g  h+(1 )g.
Proof: First consider  = 0. By Axiom 2, h  g and  2 (0;1] ) h + (1   )g 
g + (1   )g = g = h + (1   )g.
Now consider  > 0. Since 0 < 
 < 1 and h + (1   )g  g by Axiom 2, using
Axiom 2 again implies that h + (1   )g = (1   
)(h + (1   )g + 
(h + (1   )g) 
(1   
)g + 
(h + (1   )g) = h + (1   )g. 
Lemma 5 shows that an act will be indierent to a convex combination of a weakly better
and a weakly worse act, and as long as these two acts are not indierent to each other this
convex combination is unique.
Lemma 5 For all h;h1;h2 2 H , if h1 % h % h2 and h1  h2, then there exists a unique
 2 [0;1] such that h  h1 + (1   )h2.
Proof: By Lemma 4, if  exists, it is unique. Thus it suces to show existence.
If h1  h then  = 1, and if h  h2 then  = 0. So consider h1  h  h2.
Dene  = sup
n
 2 [0;1] : h % h1 + (1   )h2
o
.  = 0 is in the set, guaranteeing we
are not taking the sup over an empty set.
Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that h1 + (1   )h2  h. By Axiom 3,
since h  h2, there exists  2 (0;1) such that (h1 + (1   )h2) + (1   )h2  h ,
h1 + (1   )h2  h. By Lemma 4, if  >   0 then h  h1 + (1   )h2, so since
 < , h  h1 + (1   )h2. Hence we have a contradiction with Axiom 1.
Suppose now, again to reach a contradiction, that h  h1 + (1   )h2. By Axiom
3, since h1  h, there exists  2 (0;1) such that h  (h1 + (1   )h2) + (1   )h1
, h  (1   (1   ))h1 + (1   )h2. By denition of , if  <   1 then
h1 + (1   )h2  h, so since  < 1 ) (1   ) < 1    )  < 1   (1   ) we get
that (1   (1   ))h1 + (1   )h2  h, and we have a contradiction with Axiom 1.
Since Axiom 1 implies completeness of % we are left with h  h1 + (1   )h2.
Lemmas 6 through 10 consider acts that dier in only a single state s. Lemma 6 shows
that if the set such an act gives in state s is a line, and if the acts that give the endpoints
of the line in state s are not indierent to each other, then the rst act is indierent to
24a unique convex combination of the latter two. Lemma 6 is the rst of the lemmas that
invokes Axiom 4. Lemmas 1 through 5 have followed from only Axioms 1, 2 and 3.
Lemma 6 Let psh;qsh 2 H be acts that dier only in state s. If psh  qsh then there
exists a unique  2 [0;1] such that Co(psh;qsh)  psh + (1   )qsh.
Proof: By Axiom 4, psh  qsh ) psh % Co(psh;qsh) % qsh. Then applying Lemma 5
gives the result. 
Also, note that if psh  qsh then Co(psh;qsh)  psh since psh % Co(psh;qsh) % qsh 
psh.
Before reading the following lemmas note that for all p1;:::;pk 2 , Co(p1
sh;:::;pk
sh) =
Co(p1;:::;pk)sh since the convex hull is taken pointwise.
Lemma 7 shows that if the set an act gives in state s is a subset of a line, then the weight
on the act that gives the better endpoint of this subset in state s is the same as the weight
for the act which gives the larger set. Lemma 7 builds on Lemma 6 but does not further
invoke Axiom 4.
Lemma 7 Consider p1
sh;p2
sh 2 H with p1
sh  p2
sh. There exists a unique  2 [0;1] such





sh + (1   )p4
sh.
Proof: Figure 4 should be helpful when reading the proof. By Lemma 6 there exists a




sh. Since p3 2 Co(p1;p2) there
exists a unique 3 2 [0;1] such that p3
sh = 3p1
sh + (1   3)p2
sh, and since p4 2 Co(p1;p2)
there exists a unique 4 2 [0;1] such that p4
sh = 4p1
sh + (1   4)p2
sh.
Note that 4p1 + (1   4)Co(p1;p2) = Co(p1;4p1 + (1   4)p2) = Co(p1;p4). Hence
4p1
sh + (1   4)Co(p1;p2)sh = Co(p1;p4)sh. Thus, by Lemma 2,
F(Co(p1;p4)sh) = F(4p1
sh + (1   4)Co(p1;p2)sh)
= 4F(p1
sh) + (1   4)F(Co(p1;p2)sh)
= 4F(p1
sh) + (1   4)[F(p1
sh + (1   )F(p2
sh)]
= F(p1
sh) + (1   )F(p4
sh):
25Figure 4: Illustration for Lemma 7
p2 p1 p4 = 4p1 + (1   4)p2
v v v | {z }
| {z }
Co(p1;p4) =
Co(4p1 + (1   4)p2;p1) =
4p1 + (1   4)Co(p1;p2)
Co(p1;p2)
Next, if  = 3 4
1 4 then p1 +(1 )p4 = 3p1 +(1 3)p2 = p3. Thus Co(p1;p4)+
(1   )p4 = Co(p1 + (1   )p4;p4) = Co(p3;p4) and hence Co(p1;p4)sh + (1   )p4
sh =
Co(p3;p4)sh
Now, by Lemma 2,
F(Co(p3;p4)sh) = F(Co(p1;p4)sh) + (1   )F(p4
sh)
= [F(p1
sh) + (1   )F(p4
sh)] + (1   )F(p4
sh)
= F(p1









sh) + (1   4)F(p2
sh)]
= [3F(p1
sh) + (1   3)F(p2
sh)] + (1   )[4F(p1
sh) + (1   4)F(p2
sh)]
= F(p3
sh) + (1   )F(p4
sh): 




sh then we have Co(p3
sh;p4
sh)  p3
sh + (1   )p4
sh
for all  2 [0;1], and thus we still have Co(p3
sh;p4
sh)  p3
sh + (1   )p4
sh, but we have
lost uniqueness. If p1
sh  p2
sh we lose uniqueness as well.
Lemma 8 shows that if we are considering two acts which both give a set that is a line
in state s, the better endpoint acts of the two lines are indierent, the worse endpoint acts











Co(r1; ^ r) is the line segment r1^ r
Co(r; ~ r) is the line segment r~ r
of the two lines are indierent, and the lines are parallel, then the weight on the act that
gives the better endpoint in state s must be the same for the two acts. Again Lemma 8
builds on the previous lemmas but does not directly use Axiom 4.
Lemma 8 Consider p1
sh;p2

















sh + (1   )q2
sh.




sh + (1   )q2
sh  q
s h. Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction,
that  > .




















if we dene ^ qsh  ^ q1
sh + (1   ^ )q2
sh with ^  
 
1  2 (0;] then q1
sh  ^ qsh  q2
sh by
Lemma 4 and ^ q = ^ q1+(1 ^ )q2 2 Co(q1;q2), and thus Co(q1
sh; ^ qsh)  q1
sh+(1 )^ qsh
by Lemma 7. Note that q1
sh + (1   )^ qsh = q1
sh + (1   )[^ q1
sh + (1   ^ )q2
sh] =
q1
sh + (1   )q2
sh. Thus Co(q1
sh; ^ qsh)  Co(p1
sh;p2
sh).













sh; ^ qsh)) = F(Co(p1
sh;p2
sh): Using this and Lemma 2 again,
F(q
sh + (1   )Co(p1
sh;p2
sh)) = F(q















for all  2 [0;1]. Hence,
F(q
sh + (1   )Co(p1
sh;p2
sh)) = F(Co(q1
sh; ^ qsh) + (1   )Co(p1
sh;p2
sh)) (3)
for all ; 2 [0;1].
Figure 5 should be helpful for the following. Consider  =  = 1
2 and let r1  1
2p1+ 1
2q1




2Co(p1;p2) = Co(r; ~ r) where r  1
2p1 + 1




2Co(q1; ^ q) + 1
2Co(p1;p2) = Co(r1; ^ r) where ^ r  1
2p2 + 1
2^ q.
Since Co(p1;p2) and Co(q1;q2) are parallel, Co(r; ~ r) and Co(r1; ^ r) are both subsets
of Co(r1;r2). Thus, by Lemma 7 there exists a unique  2 [0;1] such that Co(r; ~ r)sh 
rsh + (1   )~ rsh and Co(r1; ^ r)sh  r1
sh + (1   )^ rsh.
Since by (3) Co(rsh; ~ rsh)  Co(r1
sh; ^ rsh), we have F(rsh) + (1   )F(~ rsh) =
F(r1
sh) + (1   )F(^ rsh). Using Lemma 2, we can express F(rsh), F(~ rsh), F(^ rsh),
and F(r1




































































1    F(p1
sh) + (1  
   












1    F(p1











































28(1   )F(^ rsh) = F(p1













order to have F(rsh) + (1   )F(~ rsh) = F(r1
sh) + (1   )F(^ rsh), we must have
 + 
2




1    ,  = : (4)




 2 (0;1) then p1
sh  psh  p2
sh by Lemma 4 and p = p1 + (1   )p2 2 Co(p1;p2)
and thus Co(psh;p2
sh)  psh + (1   )p2
sh by Lemma 7. Note that psh + (1  
)p2
sh = p1
sh + (1   p2
sh, and therefore Co(psh;p2
sh)  Co(q1
sh;q2















Using this and Lemma 2, we get
F(p
sh + (1   )Co(q1;q2)) = F(p





for all  2 [0;1] and
F(Co(psh;p2











sh + (1   )Co(q1;q2)) = F(Co(psh;p2
sh) + (1   )Co(q1
sh;q2
sh)): (5)
Consider  =  = 1
2. Dene 1
2p + 1
2Co(q1;q2) = Co(~ t;^ t) where ~ t = 1
2p + 1





2Co(q1;q2) = Co(t;t2) where t = 1
2p+ 1
2q1 and t2 = 1
2p2+ 1
2q2.
Since Co(~ t;^ t) and Co(t;t2) are subsets of Co(r1;r2), Co(~ t;^ t)sh  ~ tsh + (1   )^ tsh
and Co(t;t2)sh  tsh + (1   )t2
sh. By (5) we have F(~ tsh) + (1   )F(^ tsh) =
F(tsh) + (1   )F(t2
sh). Using Lemma 2, we have










F(^ tsh) = 1
2[F(p1





sh) + (1   
2 )F(p2
sh),

































sh). Hence F(~ tsh) + (1   )F(^ tsh) = F(tsh) + (1   )F(t2
sh) ,

2 (1 + ) + (1   )
2 ,  = . But since by (4) we have  =  and  is
unique this contradicts that  > .


























Now suppose that  = 1. Let p
sh = p1
sh+(1 )p2
sh and note that Co(q1;q2)sh 
p
sh. Also, Co(q1;q2)sh  Co(p
sh;p2
sh). Therefore, if we dene ^ u = 1
2p + 1
2q1 and
~ u = 1
2p+ 1
2q2, and u2 = 1
2p1+ 1
2q2, we have Co(^ u; ~ u)sh  Co(^ u;u2)sh , ^ u+(1 )~ u =
^ u + (1   )u2 ,  = 1.
Let q3  1+
2 q1+ 1 
2 q2 and q4  
2 q1+(1  


























4 =  ,  = 1.
A similar argument gives a contradiction if we assume that  < . Hence we must
have  = . 
Lemma 9 extends the result in Lemma 8 to acts where the lines are not parallel. Lemma
9 uses Axiom 4 and it is the only part of the proof of Theorem 1 that invokes Axiom 5.








sh then Co(p1;p2)sh 
Co(q1;q2)sh.
Proof: Suppose rst that p1
sh  p2
sh. Then the result follows from Axiom 4 and Lemma
2.
30So suppose now without loss of generality that p1
sh  p2
sh. (The case p2
sh  p1
sh
is analogous.) By Lemma 6, there exists a unique  2 [0;1] such that Co(p1;p2)sh 
p1
sh+(1 )p2











sh) by Lemmas 2 and 4. Let ^ psh  ^ p1
sh + (1   ^ )p2
sh with ^   
 2 (0;1).
Since ^ p 2 Co(p1;p2) we have Co(^ psh;p2
sh)  ^ psh + (1   )p2
sh by Lemma 7. See gure
6 for an illustration.
Thus Co(^ psh;p2









+ (1   )p2
sh =
p1
sh + (1   )p2
sh  q1
sh + (1   )q2
sh  Co(q1
sh;q2
sh). By Lemma 8, without loss
of generality we can let q2 = p2. (If q2 6= p2 we can replace it with an act with a parallel














, i.e. the set for
state s consists of the triangle (q1; ^ p;q2).
By Axiom 4, since Co(q1
sh;q2











By Axiom 5, since q1





































which is a contradiction with Axiom 1. 
Lemma 10 shows that if the set the act gives in state s is any set P 2 P then the act
will be indierent to an act that gives a line in state s where the endpoints of the line are
the singleton lotteries from P that are considered respectively best and worst in state s.
Lemma 10 uses Axiom 4.
Lemma 10 Consider Psh 2 H . Let vk
sh denote the act in Psh for which vk
sh % psh for
all p 2 P, and let v1
sh denote the act in Psh for which psh % v1
sh for all p 2 P. Then
Psh  Co(v1;vk)sh.







































Proof: Since P 2 P, there exist constant singleton acts v1;:::;vk such that P =
Co(v1;:::;vk). Without loss of generality, let vk
sh % vk 1
s h % ::: % v1
sh. By Lemma
2 vk
sh % psh for all p 2 P and psh % v1
sh for all p 2 P.
I will proceed by induction on the number of vertices of P (that is, on k). We already
have the result for k = 2.





sh). Consider vsh such that vk
sh % vsh % v1




























sh. Also suppose Co(v1
sh;vk
sh) % vsh. (If vsh % Co(v1
sh;vk
sh) a






















sh % vsh %
v1
sh there exists a unique ^ v 2 Co(v1;vk) such that vsh  ^ vsh  vk
sh + (1   )v1
sh. Note




sh  vsh  v1
sh. Then vk
sh  ^ vsh  v1
sh, which implies that there exists
 2 (0;1) such that vk
sh + (1   )v1
sh  v

sh  ^ vsh by Axiom 3. If   1   (1   )













sh). Therefore, because    )
1   (1   )






By Lemma 9, since vsh  ^ vsh, we have Co(vsh;v





























































































































sh) by Lemma 9, and the
same procedure as in case 2 works. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Suciency of axioms: Fix some h 2 H . Let  2  denote
the lottery for which sh % psh for all p 2 , and let  2  denote the singleton lottery
for which psh % sh for all p 2 . If sh  sh then Lemmas 1 through 10 imply that
the decision maker is indierent between anything that could happen in state s.
33So suppose sh  sh. By Lemma 6, there exists a unique s 2 [0;1] such that







sh. Since for all q1;q2 2 
with q1
sh % q2





Lemma 9 implies that Co(q1
sh;q2
sh)  sq1
sh + (1   s)q2
sh. Then Lemma 10 implies
that for all P 2 P; Psh  svk
sh + (1   s)v1
sh, where the notation is the same as in
Lemma 10. Hence, the weight s is the same for all sets in state s.
Now, let xi 2  denote the lottery that gives the outcome xi for sure. Dene
us(xi)  Fs(xi) (7)
Recall that Fs(xi) = F(h1;:::;hs 1;xi;hs+1;:::;hn) n 1
n F(h). Note that Fs(xi) =
us(xi) = s
Pm
i=1 xi(xi)us(xi) + (1   s)
Pm
i=1 xi(xi)us(xi), so it satises Theorem 1.
Now I will proceed by proving that it holds for all singleton lotteries p by induction
on the size of the support of p. Suppose that for all p 2  with jsuppfpgj = k   1,
Fs(p) =
Pk 1
i=1 p(xi)us(xi). Consider q 2  with jsuppfqgj = k and let ^ x 2 suppfqg.
Dene ^ q by
^ q(^ x) = 0;
^ q(x) =
q(x)
1 q(^ x) for all x 6= ^ x:
Note that jsuppf^ qgj = k   1 and q = q(^ x)^ x + (1   q(^ x))^ q. Hence,








= q(^ x)F(h1;:::;hs 1;^ x;hs+1;:::;hn)










by (7) and the inductive assumption. Thus, we have Fs(q) =
Pk
i=1 q(xi)us(xi). Note that
Fs(q) =
Pk
i=1 q(xi)us(xi) = s
Pm
i=1 q(xi)us(xi) + (1   s)
Pm
i=1 q(xi)us(xi), so again it
satises Theorem 1.
Finally, for general P 2 P, let v1 denote the worst vertex of P and let vk denote the
best vertex of P. By Lemmas 6 and 10













= sFs(vk) + (1   s)Fs(v1) = s
k X
i=1


















Necessity of axioms: Necessity of Axioms 1 through 3 follows from Lemma 2. To see
that Axiom 4 is necessary, suppose the representation holds and that Ps0h % Qs0h. Denote
by f
s
and fs the best respectively worst lottery in Ps0h(s) and by gs and gs the best
respectively worst lottery in Qs0h(s). Then, since the representation holds,












































































i=1 q(xi)us0(xi) for all q 2 Q:
(11)
35Dene t = argmaxt2Co(P;Q)
Pm
i=1 t(xi)us0(xi) and t = argmint2Co(P;Q)
Pm
i=1 t(xi)us0(xi):
We want to show that
s0
Pm










i=1 q(xi)us0(xi) + (1   s0)
Pm
i=1 q(xi)us(xi):
Note that for all t 2 Co(P;Q) there exists p 2 P;q 2 Q; 2 [0;1] such that t =
























i=1 q(xi)us0(xi) (otherwise the sum would not be maximized).




i=1(^ p(xi) + (1   )^ q(xi))us0(xi) =  Pm




From this, (10), and (11), we see that we must have
Pm





i=1 ^ q(xi)us0(xi) =
Pm









i=1[p(xi) + (1   )q(xi)]us0(xi) + (1   s0)
Pm
i=1[p(xi) + (1   )q(xi)]us(xi);
which is equal to
s0
Pm











i=1 p(xi)us0(xi) + (1   s0)
Pm
i=1 p(xi)us0(xi)  s0
Pm
i=1 q(xi)us0(xi) + (1  
s0)
Pm













i=1 p(xi)us0(xi), if   1 or

















36Hence, we have that
s0
Pm














h % Co(P;Q)sh % Qs0h:
To see that Axiom 5 is necessary, suppose that we have the representation and that






q(xi)us0(xi) for all q 2 Q: (13)
First, I will show that ps0h  Co(p;Q)s0h is necessary if s0
< 1. So suppose s0
< 1.





i=1 p(xi)us0(xi) for all t 2 Co(p;Q). Also, since Q 







i=1 p(xi)us0(xi) > s0
Pm
i=1 p(xi)us0(xi) + (1   s0)
Pm
i=1 t(xi)us0(xi).

































i=1(p(xi) + (1   )q(xi))us0(xi) 
Pm
i=1(p(xi) + (1   )q(xi))us0(xi) 
Pm




i=1 q(xi)us0(xi). Combining this with (14) we have that s0
Pm
i=1 t(xi)us0(xi) + (1  
s0)
Pm


































By Axiom 6 there exists at least one non-null state. Let ^ s be a non-null state. Consider

























































, Ps0h  Qs0h , (h1;:::;hs0 1;P;hs0+1;:::;hn)  (h1;:::;hs0 1;Q;hs0+1;:::;hn)






































































Since p and q are simple lotteries this means that they are evaluated according to the
same von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function in states ^ s and s0. Since von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions are unique up to a positive linear trans-
formation there exist scalars as0 > 0 and bs0 such that us0() = as0u^ s() + bs0.
Dene u(xi) = u^ s(xi). Since ^ s is non-null, we have that u^ s() is non-constant, since a
state s is null if and only if us() is constant. Then for general h;g 2 H ,



















































































p(xi)u(xi) + (1   ^ s)
m X
i=1
p(xi)u(xi)  ^ s
m X
i=1













which is again equivalent to Ps0
h  Qs0
h but P ^ sh  Q^ sh. Thus, since Axiom 7 has to hold
for all P;Q 2 P we cannot have s0 > ^ s.


























another violation of Axiom 7. Therefore, since Axiom 7 has to hold for all P;Q 2 P we
cannot have ^ s > s0.
39Hence, the only possibility is s0 = ^ s  . Thus,





























Dene (s) = as P
s as. We have that
P
s (s) = 1, and since as  0 for all s and as > 0
for some s, we also have 0  (s)  1. Thus  is a probability measure over the states.





























Necessity of axioms: The necessity of Axioms 1 through 5 follows from Theorem 1. To
prove necessity of Axiom 6, suppose we have the representation in Theorem 2 and that





























which implies that u() must be constant. Hence we must have that there exists h;g 2 H
such that h  g.




















































































































This holds for all non-null s0, and thus Ps0h  Qs0h for all non-null s0.
Proof of Theorem 3: Suciency of axioms: The proof follows that of Theorem 2
until the point where I establish that for general h;g 2 H ,



























In the proof of Theorem 2 we get a violation of Axiom 7 when we assume s0 > ^ s for
























. Since Axiom 7' only applies to singleton lot-
teries p and q, we do not get this violation here. Similarly, we do not get a contradiction
by assuming s0 < ^ s.
Dene (s) = as P
s as. We have that
P
s (s) = 1, and since as  0 for all s and as > 0
for some s, we also have 0  (s)  1. Thus  is a probability measure over the states.





























41Necessity of axioms: The proof of necessity of the axioms follows that of Theorem 2
with p(xi) = p(xi) = p(xi) and q(xi) = q(xi) = q(xi).
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